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Abstract: In this paper we propose a new multiple criteria decision aiding method to
deal with sorting problems in which alternatives are evaluated on criteria structured in
a hierarchical way and presenting interactions. The underlying preference model of the
proposed method is the Choquet integral, while the hierarchical structure of the criteria is
taken into account by applying the Multiple Criteria Hierarchy Process. Considering the
Choquet integral based on a 2-additive capacity, the paper presents a procedure to find
all the minimal sets of pairs of interacting criteria representing the preference information
provided by the Decision Maker (DM). Robustness concerns are also taken into account
by applying the Robust Ordinal Regression and the Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptabil-
ity Analysis. Even if in different ways, both of them provide recommendations on the
hierarchical sorting problem at hand by exploring the whole set of capacities compatible
with the preferences provided by the DM avoiding to take into account only one of them.
The applicability of the considered method to real world problems is demonstrated by
means of an example regarding rating of European Countries by considering economic
and financial data provided by Standard & Poor’s Global Inc.
Keywords: Decision Support System, Sorting Problems, Interactions between criteria,
Parsimonious models, Robustness concerns
1. Introduction
Sorting is one of the different type of problems that can be dealt by using a Multiple Criteria De-
cision Aiding (MCDA) method (Greco et al., 2016). In sorting problems a set of alternatives have to
be assigned to a set of classes ordered from the worst to the best with respect to the preferences pro-
vided by the Decision Maker (DM) (see Zopounidis and Doumpos 2002 for a survey on MCDA sorting
methods). Several sorting methods have been developed to cope with such type of problems having at
the basis different preference models such as value functions (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), outranking
relations (Brans and Vincke, 1985; Figueira et al., 2013) or Decision Rules (Greco et al., 2001). For
example, without any ambition to be exhaustive, let us list the following sorting methods mentioning
the underlying preference model: AHPSort (Ishizaka et al., 2012) and UTADIS (Devaud et al., 1980;
Zopounidis and Doumpos, 1999) are based on an additive value function; ELECTRE Tri B (Yu,
1992), ELECTRE Tri C (Almeida Dias et al., 2010) and ELECTRE Tri-nC (Almeida Dias et al.,
2012) are based on the ELECTRE methods, while FlowSort (Nemery and Lamboray, 2008) is based
on PROMETHEE methods; finally, (Greco et al., 2002) deal with a sorting problem using the Dom-
inance Based Rough Set Approach (DRSA).
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While all these methods can be distinguished between compensatory and non-compensatory ones,
depending on the fact that they take into account compensation or non-compensation between crite-
ria, none of them can deal with another important characteristic of decision making problems being
the possible interaction between criteria. In simple terms, two criteria are positively interacting if
the importance assigned to them together is greater than the sum of the importance assigned to each
of them separately, while two criteria are negatively interacting if the importance assigned to these
criteria together is lower than the sum of the importance assigned to them singularly. In this paper,
we will therefore develop a multicriteria sorting method based on the Choquet integral preference
model (Choquet, 1953), that is, the most well-known non-additive integral used in literature to take
into account such a type of interactions (see Grabisch 1996 for the application of the Choquet inte-
gral in MCDA). To the best of our knowledge, very few contributions are proposing methods to deal
with sorting problems with interacting criteria and a comparison between our approach and these
methods will be recalled in Section 5 after that the new proposal will be described in detail.
The application of the different sorting methods mentioned above, as well as of all MCDA meth-
ods, involves the knowledge of several parameters. For example, on one hand, the application of
an additive value function implies the knowledge of tradeoffs between criteria or, in general, the
shape of the marginal value functions; on the other hand, outranking relations can be computed by
knowing the weights of criteria as well as some thresholds used to take into account the uncertainty,
ambiguity or imprecision of the alternatives’ evaluations (Roy et al., 2014). Such parameters can be
obtained by asking the DM to provide a direct or an indirect preference information, depending on
the fact that he is willing and able to provide an exact value for them or to provide some preference
examples from which parameters compatible with these preference can be inferred. In general, the
indirect way of providing preference information is preferable for the DM since it involves a lower
cognitive effort (Jacquet-Lagre`ze and Siskos, 2001). Sorting methods do not represent an exception
with respect to this aspect and, consequently, different contributions take into account preference
information provided by the DM in an indirect way to discover one or more set of instances of the
considered preference model compatible with them. For example, different types of preference infor-
mation provided by the DM in an indirect way can be found in Corrente et al. (2017); Greco et al.
(2010a); Kadzin´ski et al. (2016); Kadzin´ski et al. (2015); Ko¨ksalan and O¨zpeynirci (2009) for sorting
methods based on value functions and in Dias and Mousseau (2003); Kadzin´ski and Ciomek (2016);
Kadzin´ski and S lowin´ski (2013); Kadzin´ski et al. (2015); Leroy et al. (2011); Zhang et al. (2014) for
sorting methods based, instead, on outranking relations.
In this paper, the proposed sorting method based on the Choquet integral preference model will
take into account an indirect preference information provided by the DM. To build a model being
able to represent the preferences provided by the DM but, at the same time, as parsimonious as
possible (Arcidiacono et al., 2020), we introduce a procedure to define a minimal sets of pairs of
interacting criteria and for the core of these sets. We think that this is an important contribution
of the paper since the core is composed of the pairs of interactions being really necessary to explain
the information provided by the DM. Moreover, the idea of the minimal sets of pairs of interacting
criteria can be used in all the applications of the Choquet integral, not only those ones related to
sorting problems.
Two more aspects of decision making problems are taken into account and introduced in the
proposed method, that is, the hierarchy of criteria and the robustness concerns.
Many sorting problems present alternatives evaluated on criteria structured in a hierarchical way.
For such a reason, in addition to the comprehensive classification of the alternatives considering all
criteria together, a partial classification of the alternatives at hand on the basis of set of homogeneous
criteria constituting macrocriteria can be beneficial for the DM who has the possibility to get a finer
representation of the goodness of the same alternatives. The hierarchy of criteria will be taken into
account in the proposed method by the Multiple Criteria Hierarchy Process (Corrente et al., 2012)
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which permits the DM to provide preferences and to get information not only at the global level but
also considering single aspects of the decision problem he is dealing with.
Considering an indirect preference information provided by the DM, more than one instance
of the preference model can be compatible with them. Therefore, giving an assignment of the
alternatives at hand using only one of them can be reductive or, anyway, misleading. To overcome
this drawback, the proposed method provides assignments by exploring the whole set of instances
of the assumed preference model by applying the Robust Ordinal Regression (ROR; Greco et al.
2008) and the Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis (SMAA; Lahdelma et al. 1998). On
one hand, the application of the ROR to the proposed sorting method will produce necessary and
possible assignments of the considered alternatives, being assignments that hold for all or for at least
one compatible model; on the other hand, the application of SMAA will give back information in
terms of frequencies with which an alternative will be assigned to a particular class or to an interval
of possible classes. Of course, the integration of ROR and SMAA with the MCHP will permit to the
DM to get the illustrated information not only in a comprehensive way and, therefore, considering
all criteria in a while, but also considering subsets of criteria of particular interest for him. Moreover,
to get a final classification on the basis of the frequencies provided by the SMAA application, a new
procedure based on the minimization of misclassification errors is presented for the first time in this
paper.
The applicability of the introduced hierarchical, interacting and robust sorting method will be
demonstrated by means of an example regarding the financial rating of European sovereign debts
evaluated by Standard & Poors Global Inc. In particular, we shall show that the proposed method
is quite predictive with respect to other sorting methods based on different preference models.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, a first didactic example
showing the necessity to take into account interacting effects between criteria in sorting problems
is given; Section 3 provides the background of the new proposal. In particular, the hierarchical
Choquet integral preference model is briefly recalled; in Section 4, we introduce the new hierarchical,
interacting and robust multicriteria sorting method; a comparison between the proposed method and
others taking into account the interactions between criteria is given in Section 5; Section 6 contains
the case study in which the new method is applied to the financial rating of 28 European Countries;
finally, conclusions and further directions of research are collected in Section 7.
2. A first motivating example
Let suppose that a Credit Rating Agency (CRA)1 has to provided an ordinal classification of
several sovereign bonds evaluated on economic, governmental and financial points of view. The bonds
have to be classified in four classes ordered from the best to the worst as follows: AA ≻ A ≻ BB ≻ B,
where X ≻ Y means that the alternatives from class X are preferred to the alternatives from class Y,
X, Y = AA,A,BB,B. From an MCDA perspective this is a sorting problem where the bonds are the
alternatives to be classified and the economic, governmental and financial points of view represent
the evaluation criteria (G = {gEco, gGov, gF in}). The CRA is therefore interested into building a
sorting model that could be used to classify all the considered bonds.
For this reason, the analyst decides to apply the simplest preference model being an additive
value function U : A→ [0, 1]
U(x) = U(g1(x), . . . , gn(x)) =
n∑
i=1
ui(gi(x)) (1)
1A credit rating agency is a company that assigns a rating to a debtor according to its ability to pay back its debt.
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where A denotes the set of alternatives, g1, . . . , gn are the considered criteria and ui are the marginal
value functions related to criteria gi. Without loss of the generality, in the following we suppose that
gi : A → R+. We shall assume that the greater U(x) the better the alternative a and that classes
are ordered in an increasing way with respect to preferences so that C1 and Cp denote, respectively,
the worst and the best classes to which an alternative can be assigned. Of course if a is assigned to
Ch and b is assigned to Ck, with h > k, then U(a) > U(b).
To build such a model, let us suppose that the analyst asks to the representative of the CRA to
assign four bonds {a, b, c, d} evaluated on a [0,20] scale on the three aspects above as shown in Table
1. Consequently, the representative of the CRA performs the assignments shown in the last column
of the same table.
Table 1: Evaluation of the four sovereign bonds and the CRA assignment
Sovereign bonds\criteria gEco gGov gF in Class
a 11 9 5 BB
b 7 12 5 B
c 11 9 8 A
d 7 12 8 AA
Since a is assigned to BB and b is assigned to B, following what has been said before, U(a) > U(b).
Analogously, because of the assignments of c and d to A and AA, respectively, it should also hold that
U(d) > U(c). Using the function in eq. (1), the two pieces of information are therefore translated
into the following constraints{
U(a) = uEco(11) + uGov(9) + uF in(5) > uEco(7) + uGov(12) + uF in(5) = U(b);
U(c) = uEco(11) + uGov(9) + uF in(8) < uEco(7) + uGov(12) + uF in(8) = U(d),
being clearly in contradiction.
Looking carefully at the performances shown in Table 1, it is indeed evident that the set of criteria
{gEco, gGov} is not preferentially independent of criterion gF in (Wakker, 1989). Indeed, a and c have
the same performances on gEco and gGov (11 and 9) as well as b and d (7 and 12). At the same
time, a and b have the same performance on gF in (5) as happens also for c and d (8). Consequently,
if {gEco, gGov} would be preferentially independent of gF in, the preference of a over b should imply
the preference of c over d even if, the provided assignments of c and d imply exactly the opposite
preference. This is due to the fact that there is a certain degree of interaction between the criteria
at hand.
The very didactic example shown above proves that eventual positive or negative interactions
between criteria need to be properly taken into account in MCDA methods developed to deal with
sorting problems.
3. Background
In this section, we shall briefly introduce the notation that will be used along the paper, together
with the methods that constitute the basis of the new proposal, that is, the Multiple Criteria Hier-
archy Process (MCHP; Corrente et al. 2012) and the Choquet integral preference model (Choquet,
1953; Grabisch, 1996). In the MCHP, all criteria are not at the same level but they are structured
in a hierarchical way. The application of the MCHP will give the possibility to consider a particular
aspect of the considered problem, without taking into account all criteria simultaneously. The Cho-
quet integral, instead, is able to take into consideration the possible positive or negative interactions
between criteria. The description of the Choquet integral will be given in the context of the MCHP.
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3.1. Notation
The used notation is the following:
• A = {a, b, . . .} is the set of alternatives,
• G is the whole set of criteria (at all levels of the hierarchy), and g0 is the root criterion,
• IG is the set of indices of the criteria in G,
• GE ⊆ G is the set of all elementary criteria in G, that is, the criteria located at the bottom
of the hierarchy. The alternatives will be evaluated on these criteria only. Consequently, to
each a ∈ A will be associated the vector
(
gt1(a), . . . , gt|GE |(a)
)
∈ R|GE |, which components are
the evaluations of a on the considered elementary criteria. In the following, without loss of
generality, we shall assume that all elementary criteria have an increasing direction of preference
that is, the greater the evaluation of an alternative on the considered elementary criterion, the
better the alternative is on it (for some recent contributions taking into account non-monotonic
criteria in sorting problems, see Guo et al. (2019); Kadzin´ski et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2019)),
• EG ⊆ IG is the set of indices of the elementary criteria,
• gr is a non-elementary criterion, that is a criterion gr ∈ G \GE . In particular, by g0 we denote
the root criterion and, consequently, the whole set of criteria in the hierarchy,
• E(gr) ⊆ EG is the set of indices of all the elementary criteria descending from gr (it follows
that E(g0) = EG),
• given F ⊆ G, E(F ) = ∪gr∈FE(gr), that is the set of the indices of the elementary criteria
descending from at least one criterion in F ,
• Gkr ⊆ G is the set of subcriteria of gr located at level k.
3.2. The hierarchical Choquet integral preference model
As already explained in the introduction, in real world applications, the set of evaluation criteria
is not mutually preferentially independent since the criteria at hand can present a certain degree of
positive or negative interaction. In such cases, to aggregate the performances of the alternatives on
the criteria at hand, non additive integrals are used and, among them, the Choquet integral is the
most well-known. In the following, we shall briefly describe its application considering the set of
elementary criteria GE .
The Choquet integral application is based on a capacity µ : 2GE → [0, 1], being a set function
such that µ(∅) = 0, µ(GE) = 1 and µ(R) 6 µ(T ), ∀R ⊆ T ⊆ GE. Given a ∈ A, the Choquet
integral of its performances’ vector
(
gt1(a), . . . , gt|GE |(a)
)
is
Ch
(
gt1(a), . . . , gt|GE |(a)
)
= Ch(a) =
|GE |∑
i=1
µ (Nti)
[
g(ti)(a)− g(ti−1)(a)
]
,
where (·) stands for a permutation of the indices of the elementary criteria such that 0 = g(t0)(a) 6
g(t1)(a) 6 . . . 6 g(t|GE |)
(a) and Nti =
{
gtj ∈ GE : gtj (a) > g(ti)(a)
}
. In the following, for the
sake of simplicity, we shall say “the Choquet integral of a” instead of “the Choquet integral of(
gt1(a), . . . , gt|GE |(a)
)
”.
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To make things easier, in general, the Mo¨bius transform m of the capacity µ is taken into account
(Rota, 1964). m : 2GE → R is a set function such that, for all R ⊆ GE, µ(R) =
∑
T⊆R
m(T ) and, vice
versa, m(R) =
∑
T⊆R
(−1)(|R|−|T |)µ(T ).
In terms of the Mo¨bius transform m of µ, the Choquet integral of a can be computed as
Ch(a) =
∑
T⊆GE
m(T ) min
gti∈T
{gti(a)}, (2)
while the monotonicity and normalization constraints of µ can be rewritten as
• m(∅) = 0,
∑
T⊆GE
m(T ) = 1,
• ∀gti ∈ GE and ∀R ⊆ GE \ {gti},
∑
T⊆R
m (T ∪ {gti}) > 0.
Since the application of the Choquet integral involves the knowledge of 2|GE |−2 parameters, that
is, one for each subset of criteria of GE apart from ∅ and GE (µ(∅) = 0 and µ(GE) = 1), in real
world applications, in general, 2-additive measures are used where, a measure µ is said k-additive
(Grabisch, 1997) if its Mo¨bius transform is such that m(T ) = 0 for all T ⊆ GE : |T | > k. By using
a 2-additive measure, the Choquet integral can be reformulated as
Ch(a) =
∑
gti∈GE
m ({gti}) gti(a) +
∑
{gti ,gtj}⊆GE
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
min{gti(a), gtj(a)} (3)
while the monotonicity and normalization constraints become
• m(∅) = 0,
∑
gti∈GE
m ({gti}) +
∑
{gti ,gtj}⊆GE
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
= 1,
• ∀gti ∈ GE and ∀T ⊆ GE \ {gti}, m ({gti}) +
∑
gtj∈T
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
> 0.
Applying the MCHP to the Choquet integral preference model, for each non-elementary criterion
gr it is possible to define a capacity µ
k
r (in the following, we shall write only µr) on the power set
of Gkr that assigns a value to each subset of criteria descending from gr and located at the level k
(Angilella et al., 2016). The capacity µr and its Mo¨bius transform mr can be expressed in terms
of µ and m defined on the power set of GE (see Angilella et al. 2016 for technical details) and,
consequently, also the Choquet integral of a on gr can be expressed in terms of µ by applying the
following equality
Chr(a) =
Ch(ar)
µ(E(gr))
(4)
where ar is a fictitious alternative having the same evaluations of a on all elementary criteria de-
scending from gr (that is criteria gt with t ∈ E(gr)) and null evaluation on the remaining elementary
criteria.
Using the Choquet integral preference model, it is obvious that the importance of a criterion
is not dependent on itself only, but also from its contribution to all possible coalitions of criteria.
For such a reason, the Shapley index (Shapley, 1953) and the Murofushi index (Murofushi, 1993)
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are computed obtaining, on one hand, the importance of a criterion and, on the other hand, the
importance of a pair of criteria.
Generalizing these two indices to the MCHP, given a criterion g(r,w) ∈ G
k
r , that is a subcriterion of
gr at the level k, the Shapley index ϕr
({
g(r,w)
})
is computed as
ϕr
({
g(r,w)
})
=


∑
t∈E(g(r,w))
m ({gt}) +
∑
t1,t2∈E(g(r,w))
m ({gt1 , gt2}) +
∑
t1∈E(g(r,w))
t2∈E(Gkr\{g(r,w)})
m({gt1 , gt2})
2


1
µ(E(gr))
,
(5)
and, analogously, given g(r,w1), g(r,w2) ∈ G
k
r , the Murofushi index ϕr
(
{g(r,w1), g(r,w2)}
)
is computed as
ϕr
(
{g(r,w1), g(r,w2)}
)
=


∑
t1∈E(g(r,w1))
t2∈E(g(r,w2))
m ({gt1, gt2})


1
µ (E (gr))
.
4. A hierarchical, interacting and robust sorting method
In multiple criteria decision problems which are hierarchically structured, for each non-elementary
criterion gr, the sorting procedure consists in the assignment of each alternative a ∈ A to one class
Ch, h ∈ {1, . . . , pr}, taking into account only the elementary criteria descending from gr, where Cpr
is the class of top performing alternatives and C1 is the class of the worst alternatives. Of course,
the number of class to which an alternative can be assigned can be dependent on the considered
criterion and has not to be the same for all criteria.
According to Corrente et al. (2017), we consider a threshold based sorting procedure. This means
that each class Ch is defined by a lower threshold b
r
h−1 and an upper threshold b
r
h. To perform
the assignment, we need, therefore, pr + 1 thresholds b
r
0, . . . , b
r
pr
for each criterion r, such that 0 =
br0 < . . . < b
r
pr
and brpr is the highest possible evaluation of an alternative on gr. This means
that brpr = Chr (optt1, . . . , opttr), where t1, . . . , tr ∈ E (gr) are the indices of the elementary criteria
descending from gr and optt = max
a∈A
gt(a) for all t ∈ {t1, . . . , tr}.
For each alternative a ∈ A, for each non-elementary criterion gr and for each class Ch, h =
1, . . . , pr:
• a is assigned to Ch on gr, and we shall write a −→
r
Ch, iff b
r
h−1 6 Chr(a) < b
r
h; in particular, in
the uncommon case in which Chr(a) = b
r
pr
, then a is assigned to Cpr on gr,
• a is assigned at most to Ch on gr, and we shall write a −→
r
C6h, iff Chr(a) < b
r
h (the inequality
becomes weak if h = pr),
• a is assigned at least to Ch on gr, and we shall write a −→
r
C>h, iff Chr(a) > b
r
h,
• a is assigned to [Ch1 , Ch2] on gr, 1 6 h1 < h2 6 pr, and we shall write a −→
r
[Ch1 , Ch2], iff
brh1−1 6 Chr(a) < b
r
h2
(the second inequality becomes weak if h2 = pr).
To find the parameters necessary to compute the Choquet integral of the alternatives at hand
as well as the value of the thresholds delimiting the classes, it can be chosen a direct or an indirect
technique (Jacquet-Lagre`ze and Siskos, 2001). In the first case, the DM has to specify all parameters
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involved in the model (the Mo¨bius coefficients and the thresholds brh). In the second one, the DM has
to provide some preference information in terms of class assignments of some alternative he knows
well
(
a −→
r
Ch, a −→
r
C6h, a −→
r
C>h, or a −→
r
[Ch1 , Ch2]
)
, pairwise comparison of some alternatives (a
is preferred to b on gr or a and b are indifferent on gr), comparisons between criteria in terms of their
importance (“g(r,w1) is more important than g(r,w2)” or “g(r,w1) and g(r,w2) are equally important”,
with g(r,w1), g(r,w2) ∈ G
k
r for some r and some k) or possible interactions between criteria (g(r,w1)
and g(r,w2) are positively [negatively] interacting) and parameters compatible with these assignments
are therefore inferred in a computational way. After that all preferences provided by the DM are
converted into linear inequalities (see below), the set of constraints representing them is the following:
Chr(a) > b
r
h−1,
Chr(a)− b
r
h 6 −ε
}
if a −→
r
Ch
Chr(a) > b
r
h−1, if a −→
r
C>h
Chr(a)− b
r
h 6 −ε, if a −→
r
C6h
Chr(a) > b
r
h1−1
,
Chr(a)− b
r
h2
6 −ε
}
if a −→
r
[Ch1 , Ch2]
br0 = 0,
brpr = Chr (optt1, . . . , opttr) ,
brh > b
r
h−1 + ε, h = 1, . . . , pr

 for all gr ∈ G \GE ,
EOtherConstrs


EDMCh
where ε is an auxiliary variable used to convert the strict inequalities in weak ones2 and EOtherConstrs
is the set of constraints translating the further preference information we specified above and that
can be the following:
• Chr(a) > Chr(b) + ε iff a is preferred to b on gr,
• Chr(a) = Chr(b) iff a and b are indifferent on gr
3,
• ϕr
({
g(r,w1)
})
> ϕr
({
g(r,w2)
})
+ ε iff g(r,w1) is more important than g(r,w2),
• ϕr
(
{g(r,w1), g(r,w2)}
)
> ε iff g(r,w1) and g(r,w2) are positively interacting,
• ϕr
(
{g(r,w1), g(r,w2)}
)
6 −ε iff g(r,w1) and g(r,w2) are negatively interacting.
Denoting by ETC the following set of technical constraints related to the considered preference
model ∑
gti∈GE
m ({gti}) +
∑
{gti ,gtj}⊆GE
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
= 1,
∀gti ∈ GE and ∀T ⊆ GE \ {gti}, m ({gti}) +
∑
gtj∈T
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
> 0


ETCCh
one can check for the existence of at least one instance of the assumed preference model compatible
with the preferences provided by the DM solving the following LP problem:
2For example, constraint x > y is converted into x 6 y + ε.
3See Branke et al. (2017) for different ways of translating the indifference between alternatives
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ε∗Ch = max ε, subject to,
EDMCh ∪ E
TC
Ch .
Two cases can occur:
• iff EDMCh ∪E
TC
Ch is feasible and ε
∗
Ch > 0, then there exists at least one instance of the considered
preference model compatible with the preferences provided by the DM (briefly “a compatible
model”),
• iff EDMCh ∪ E
TC
Ch is infeasible or ε
∗
Ch 6 0, then, there not exists any instance of the assumed
preference model compatible with the considered preferences and the cause of this incompat-
ibility can be detected by using one of the procedure proposed in Mousseau et al. (2003) and
Mousseau et al. (2006).
4.1. Looking for a parsimonious representation of the preference information
As already underlined in Section 3.2, the use of the 2-additive Choquet integral involves the
knowledge of |EG|+
(
|EG|
2
)
values, one for each elementary criterion and one for each pair of elementary
criteria. Anyway, it could be advisable to represent the preferences of the DM by using a preference
model as parsimonious as possible in terms of the number of parameters involved. For such a
reason, if there exists at least one instance of the 2-additive Choquet integral compatible with the
preferences provided by the DM, one can ask which is the minimum number of pairs of interacting
criteria necessary to represent these preferences. Therefore, in the following, we shall describe in
detail how to compute a minimal set of pairs of interacting criteria such that the 2-additive Choquet
integral restores the preferences provided by the DM. In the following, for simplicity, we shall speak
of minimal set of interacting criteria. Let us observe that the following methodology presents a
great interest not only for the introduced method but also for all the MCDA methods in which the
underlying preference model is the 2-additive Choquet integral.
Assuming that the set of constraints EDMCh ∪ E
TC
Ch is feasible and that ε
∗
Ch > 0 (therefore there
exists at least one compatible model), and considering a binary variable γtitj ∈ {0, 1} for each pair
of elementary criteria {gti, gtj} ⊆ GE , to check for a minimal set of interacting criteria one has to
solve the following MILP problem:
γ∗
1
= min
∑
{ti,tj}⊆EG
γtitj , subject to,
EDMCh ∪ E
TC
Ch ,
δ 6 ε 6 ε∗Ch,
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
> −γtitj ,
m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
6 γtitj ,

 for all {ti, tj} ⊆ EG,


EMinCh
(6)
where δ is a very small positive number fixed to ensure that ε is positive.
As proved in Grabisch and Miranda (2015), using a 2-additive Choquet integral, the Mo¨bius
parameters of a pair of criteria take values in the interval [−1, 1]. Consequently, last two constraints
in EMinCh ensure that if γtitj = 0, then the corresponding Mo¨bius parameter m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
is null and,
therefore, there is not any interaction between gti and gtj . In the opposite case
(
γtitj = 1
)
, there
is a positive or negative interaction between the elementary criteria gti and gtj . Two cases can be
considered:
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case 1) γ∗
1
= 0: all pairs of elementary criteria do not present any interaction and, therefore, a
weighted sum is able to represent the preferences provided by the DM4,
case 2) γ∗
1
> 0: a weighted sum is not able to represent the preferences provided by the DM and it
is necessary to take into account the interaction between at least one pair of elementary criteria
to represent these preferences. In particular, the value γ∗
1
is the minimum number of pairs of
interacting criteria necessary to represent the provided preferences.
In case 2), denoting by Γ∗1 the vector of binary variables obtained as a solution of the MILP
problem (6), the set ΓMin1 =
{
γtitj ∈ Γ
∗
1 : γtitj = 1
}
gives information on the pairs of interacting
criteria, while the sign of the corresponding Mo¨bius parameters m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
gives information on
the type of interaction (positive if m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
> 0 or negative if m
(
{gti, gtj}
)
< 0).
In general, more than one set of interacting criteria can represent the provided preferences and,
following Angilella et al. (2014), it could be interesting finding all of them. As explained above,
solving the MILP problem (6), we obtain the first minimal set of interacting criteria ΓMin1 . To check
for another possible minimal set of interacting criteria having the same cardinality of ΓMin1 , one has
to solve the following MILP problem
γ∗
2
= min
∑
{ti,tj}⊆EG
γtitj , subject to,∑
{ti,tj}⊆EG
γtitj = γ
∗
1
,
EMinCh ,∑
γtitj∈Γ
Min
1
γtitj 6 |Γ
Int
1 | − 1


EMin2Ch
(7)
where the last constraint is included to avoid that the minimal set ΓMin1 of pairs of interacting criteria
is obtained again. If EMin2Ch is infeasible, then there is not any other minimal set of interacting criteria,
while, in the opposite case there exists another minimal set of interacting criteria compatible with
the preferences of the DM. Denoting by Γ∗2 the vector of binary variables γtitj obtained by solving the
MILP problem (7) and defining ΓMin2 =
{
γtitj ∈ Γ
∗
2 : γtitj = 1
}
the subset composed of the binary
variables equal to 1, this gives information on the new minimal set of interacting criteria. One can
therefore proceed in an iterative way to check for other minimal sets of interacting criteria. Then, if
ΓMink−1 is the set of binary variables equal to 1 obtained at the iteration k − 1, the possible k-th set of
pairs of interacting criteria is obtained by solving the MILP problem
4Indeed, the fact that EDM ∪ETC is feasible and ε∗ > 0 implies that there is at least one instance of the 2-additive
Choquet integral compatible with the preferences provided by the DM and the weighted sum is a particular case of
all Choquet integrals (not only 2-additive ones) since it corresponds to the case in which all interactions are null.
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γ∗
k
= min
∑
{ti,tj}⊆EG
γtitj , subject to,∑
{ti,tj}⊆EG
γtitj = γ
∗
1
,
EMinCh ,∑
γtitj∈Γ
Min
1
γtitj 6 |Γ
Min
1 | − 1,
. . . . . . . . .∑
γtitj∈Γ
Min
k−1
γtitj 6 |Γ
Min
k−1 | − 1.


EMinkCh
(8)
Once all minimal sets of interacting criteria have been obtained, following a basic idea of rough set
theory Pawlak (1991), one can compute the core being the set of pairs of interacting elementary
criteria {gti, gtj} such that γtitj ∈ Γ
Min
1 ∩ . . . ∩ Γ
Min
k . The core gives therefore the set of pairs of
interacting criteria that are present in all minimal sets and, therefore, are essential to represent the
preferences provided by the DM. Let us observe that it is possible that a pair of interacting criteria
in the core presents positive interaction in some minimal sets and negative interaction in others as
will be shown in the case study described in Section 6.
4.2. Non Additive Robust Ordinal Regression applied to the hierarchical and interacting sorting
method
If there exist at least one compatible model, in general, there are many of them. All compatible
models provide the same recommendations on the reference alternatives in ADM ⊆ A but they can
give different information on the alternatives in A \ ADM . For such a reason, the choice of only
one compatible instance is unjustified or at least arbitrary. Therefore, in this section, we shall show
how to apply the Robust Ordinal Regression (ROR; Greco et al. 2008) to the new proposal. ROR
provides recommendations on the problem at hand taking into account the whole set of compatible
models computing a necessary and a possible preference relation. The extension of ROR to the
Choquet integral preference model is known as Non Additive Robust Ordinal Regression (NAROR)
and it has been proposed by Angilella et al. (2010). Considering the hierarchical structure of criteria,
the application of NAROR to the proposed method permits to define the following necessary and
possible assignments for each alternative a ∈ A, for each non-elementary criterion gr and for each
class Ch, h = 1, . . . , pr (see also Greco et al. 2010b):
1. a is necessarily assigned to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
N
−→
r
Ch, iff b
r
h−1 6 Chr(a) < b
r
h for all
compatible models (the second inequality becomes weak if h = pr),
2. a is possibly assigned to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
P
−→
r
Ch, iff b
r
h−1 6 Chr(a) < b
r
h for at
least one compatible model (the second inequality becomes weak if h = pr),
3. a is necessarily assigned at least to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
N
−→
r
C>h, iff Chr(a) > b
r
h−1
for all compatible models,
4. a is possibly assigned at least to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
P
−→
r
C>h, iff Chr(a) > b
r
h−1 for
at least one compatible model,
5. a is necessarily assigned at most to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
N
−→
r
C6h, iff Chr(a) < b
r
h for
all compatible models (the inequality becomes weak if h = pr),
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6. a is possibly assigned at most to Ch on gr, and we shall write a
P
−→
r
C6h, iff Chr(a) < b
r
h for at
least one compatible model (the inequality becomes weak if h = pr).
From the definitions of necessary and possible assignments above, it is clear that for each a ∈ A
and for each non-elementary criterion gr, the following two properties must hold
5:
• either a is necessarily assigned at least to Ch on gr
(
a
N
−→
r
C>h
)
or a is possibly assigned at
most to Ch−1 on gr
(
a
P
−→
r
C6h−1
)
, with h ∈ {2, . . . , pr},
• either a is necessarily assigned at most to Ch on gr
(
a
N
−→
r
C6h
)
or a is possibly assigned at
least to Ch+1 on gr
(
a
P
−→
r
C>h+1
)
, with h ∈ {1, . . . , pr − 1}.
From a computational point of view, for each a ∈ A, for each non-elementary criterion gr and for
each Ch, h = 1, . . . , pr, the necessary and possible assignments above can be obtained as follows:
2. Defined EPh = E
DM
Ch ∪E
TC
Ch ∪{Chr(a) > b
r
h−1; Chr(a)+ ε 6 b
r
h}, a
P
−→
r
C6h iff E
P
h is feasible and
εPh > 0, where ε
P
h = max ε subject to E
P
h
6,
3. Defined EN
>h = E
DM
Ch ∪ E
TC
Ch ∪
{
Chr(a) 6 b
r
h−1 − ε
}
, a
N
−→
r
C>h iff E
N
>h is infeasible or ε
N
>h 6 0,
where εN
>h = max ε subject to E
N
>h,
4. Defined EP
>h = E
DM
Ch ∪E
TC
Ch ∪
{
Chr(a) > b
r
h−1
}
, a
P
−→
r
C>h iff E
P
>h is feasible and ε
P
>h > 0, where
εP
>h = max ε subject to E
P
>h,
5. Defined EN
6h = E
DM
Ch ∪ E
TC
Ch ∪ {Chr(a) > b
r
h}, a
N
−→
r
C6h iff E
N
6h is infeasible or ε
N
6h 6 0, where
εN6h = max ε subject to E
N
6h
7,
6. Defined EP
6h = E
DM
Ch ∪ E
TC
Ch ∪ {Chr(a) 6 b
r
h − ε}, a
P
−→
r
C6h iff E
P
6h is feasible and ε
P
6h > 0,
where εP
6h = max ε subject to E
P
6h
8.
To avoid to solve a MILP problem, the necessary assignment of an alternative a to a single class
Ch on criterion gr can be computed on the basis of a
N
−→
r
C>h and a
N
−→
r
C6h. In particular, a
N
−→
r
Ch
iff a
N
−→
r
C>h and a
N
−→
r
C6h.
4.3. Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis applied to the hierarchical and interacting sorting
method
Looking at the assignments provided by the application of the NAROR, it is very common that
an alternative is possibly assigned to more than one class with respect to a particular criterion in the
hierarchy as well as at comprehensive level. For such a reason, it is useful to have an estimate of the
number of compatible instances, with respect to the whole set of compatible instances, giving a certain
assignment. To this aim, we shall propose the application of the SMAA methodology that has been
introduced at first in Lahdelma et al. (1998) to deal with ranking problems in which the underlying
5Analogous properties for a hierarchical sorting in case the assumed preference model is an additive value function
can be found in Corrente et al. (2017).
6EPh = E
DM
Ch ∪E
TC
Ch ∪ {Chr(a) > b
r
h−1; Chr(a) 6 b
r
h} if h = pr.
7EN6h = E
DM
Ch ∪ E
TC
Ch ∪ {Chr(a) > b
r
h + ε} if h = pr.
8EP6h = E
DM
Ch ∪ E
TC
Ch ∪ {Chr(a) 6 b
r
h} if h = pr.
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preference model was a weighted sum (see Pelissari et al. 2019 for a recent survey on SMAA). After
that, SMAA has been further extended and applied to sorting problems (Kadzin´ski and Tervonen,
2013) as well as to the Choquet integral preference model (Angilella et al., 2015, 2016).
The application of SMAA to sorting problems permits to explore the whole set of models compatible
with the preferences provided by the DM giving recommendations in terms of frequency of assignment
of an alternative to a certain class with respect to a particular criterion in the hierarchy.
Denoting by (Ch ,B) the whole set of compatible models (that is vectors (Ch,b) such that
the Mo¨bius transform of a capacity in Ch and the threshold values in b are compatible with
the preferences provided by the DM), for each a ∈ A, for each non-elementary criterion gr and
for each class Ch, h = 1, . . . , pr, the class acceptability index CAI(a, h, r) is computed as follows
(Kadzin´ski and Tervonen, 2013):
CAI(a, h, r) =
∫
(Ch,b)∈(Ch ,B)
CMF (Ch,b, a, h, r) dP (Ch,b) .
where P (Ch,b) is a probability measure on (Ch ,B) which is usually assumed as uniform or inferred
from some DM preference information (see ). CAI(a, h, r) ∈ [0, 1] is the frequency with which a
is assigned to Ch on gr, and CMF (Ch,b, a, h, r) is a class membership function being equal to 1
iff Chr(a) ∈ [b
r
h−1, b
r
h[ and 0 otherwise. Of course, the same membership function is equal to 1 if
Chr(a) ∈ [b
r
h−1, b
r
h] in case h = pr.
From a technical point of view, the integral above can be computed by the application of Monte
Carlo methods (see Corrente et al. 2019 for a more detailed description of the application of Monte
Carlo methods to compute multidimensional integrals in case the Choquet integral is assumed as
preference model).
To further support the DM in the choice of a final classification, let us show how to inte-
grate the class acceptability indices computed above. Even if some approaches to aggregate the
results of the application of the SMAA for ranking problems have been presented (for example,
Kadzin´ski and Michalski 2016 and Vetschera 2017), to the best of our knowledge a similar approach
for sorting problems has not been proposed. For such a reason, in the following lines we shall
briefly describe a procedure which aims to minimize misleading classifications considering the behav-
ior of the DM. In this perspective, for each non-elementary criterion gr we consider a loss function
(Gneiting and Raftery, 2007; Savage, 1971; Schervish, 1989) defined as follow
L(y) =
∑
a∈A
pr∑
h=1
ya,h
∑
k 6=h
d(Ck, Ch)CAI(a, k, r), (9)
where
• y = [ya,h, a ∈ A, h = 1, . . . , pr], with ya,h = 1 if alternative a is assigned to the class Ch and
ya,h = 0 otherwise;
• d(Ck, Ch) is a function which assigns a weight to CAI(a, k, r) depending on the distance between
the classes Ck and Ch. As in Rademaker et al. (2009), d(Ck, Ch) has not to be a metric but it
has to satisfy (i) d(Ck, Ch) > 0 for all h, k ∈ {1, . . . , pr}; (ii) d(Ck, Ch) = 0 ⇔ Ck = Ch; (iii)
d(Ci, Cj) 6 d(Ci, Ck) and d(Cj, Ck) 6 d(Ci, Ck) for all Ci < Cj < Ck.
Clearly, since the choice of the distance d(Ck, Ch) in eq. (9) affects the assignments, this procedure
requires to involve the DM into the process. For example, one DM could decide that the loss
in assigning an alternative to a wrong class is marginally decreasing and, therefore, d(Ch, Ck) =√
|h− k| or one can consider that the same loss is marginally increasing and therefore, setting a
distance as d(Ch, Ck) = (h− k)
2.
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Solving the following MILP problem,
L∗ = min
y
L(y), subject to
pr∑
h=1
ya,h = 1, for all a ∈ A
(10)
we get a single assignment summarizing the class acceptability indices previously computed. One
can wonder if there exists another assignment presenting the same L∗ value. Therefore, denoting
by y∗ the vector of binary variables obtained as solution of the previous MILP problem, another
assignment can be obtained by solving (10) with the addition of the following constraint∑
y∗
a,h
∈y∗: y∗
a,h
=1
y∗a,h 6 L
∗ − 1,
avoiding to find, again, the same solution obtained solving the previous MILP problem. If the new
MILP problem is feasible, then there is another possible assignment and others can be found by
proceeding in an iterative way as shown above. In the opposite case, the found assignment is the
unique one.
5. Comparison with other methods dealing with sorting problems in presence of inter-
acting criteria
As already stated in the introduction, very few contributions dealt with the use of the Choquet
integral preference model for sorting problems and all of them differ with respect to our proposal
in several aspects. In Roubens (2001), the authors propose the application of the Choquet integral
preference model for sorting problems. The method is articulated in two parts. In the first part,
for each alternative and for each criterion a net score is computed. It is given by the difference
between the number of alternatives to which the alternative is preferred on the criterion and the
number of alternatives preferred to it on the same criterion. This pre-scoring phase is performed
to put all evaluations on the same scale since this is essential for the application of the Choquet
integral preference model. However, we are not dealing with this problem in the paper. Moreover,
other methods can also be used to put all evaluations on the same scale such as the one proposed
in Angilella et al. (2015) or the one proposed in Greco et al. (2018) and that will be used in the
case study in the next section. The second phase is related, instead, to the use of the Choquet
integral to represent a complete classification provided by the DM or a partial classification regarding
some alternatives he knows well. In particular, in the second case (being the most similar to our
approach), the DM provides some precise classifications that are translated in linear constraints
so that if alternatives a and b are assigned to classes Ch1 and Ch2, respectively, with h1 > h2,
then Ch(a) has to be greater than Ch(b). Then, by solving an LP problem one checks for the
existence of an instance of the Choquet integral compatible with these preferences. The thresholds
delimiting the classes are not variables of the problem but they are defined ex-post so that bh−1 =
min
{
Ch(a) : a ∈ A and a −−−→
DM
Ch
}
that is, bh−1 is equal to the minimum value of the Choquet
integral of all alternatives assigned by the DM to the class Ch. The same thresholds are then used
to assign all the other alternatives which are not provided as reference examples by the DM.
As mentioned above, our proposal is different from Roubens (2001) for several reasons. First
of all, in our approach the thresholds are considered as variables and are not defined ex-post from
the assignments provided by the DM. Indeed, in Roubens (2001), the assignment of non-reference
alternatives is strictly dependent on which alternatives are provided as reference examples from the
DM. Let us explain this point more in detail. Let us assume that the DM is dealing with a simple
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problem in which 6 alternatives {a1, . . . , a6} have to be assigned to 2 different classes {C1, C2} and
that, with respect to his preference system, a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ a6 (where ai ≻ ak means that ai
is preferred to ak) with the first three alternatives (a1, a2, a3) classified in C2 and the last three
(a4, a5, a6) classified in C1 since he retains the first three alternatives as good and the last three as
bad. Let also suppose that there exist at least one capacity such that the Choquet integral is able to
restore these preferences. If the DM provides information regarding alternatives a1 and a4 only, the
method proposed in Roubens (2001) would assign a1 to C2 putting all the others in class C1. This
because b1 = Ch(a1) and all the other alternatives have a Choquet evaluation lower than b1. In such
case, the hypothetical classification of the DM would not be restored. Instead, in our approach the
thresholds are not fixed. We consider all the thresholds compatible with the preference information
provided by the DM. The assignment of only a1 to C2 does not avoid that other alternatives could
be assigned to C2 as well.
The other differences are mainly due to the fact that we are taking into account a hierarchical
structure of criteria permitting, therefore, to get alternatives’ assignments not only at comprehensive
level but also considering a particular node of the hierarchy and, moreover, the fact that we are
considering robustness concerns by using the NAROR and the SMAA methodologies. Indeed, while
in Roubens (2001) the proposed procedure gives a single capacity for which the Choquet integral
is compatible with the preferences provided by the DM and the same capacity is therefore used to
perform the assignment of the remaining alternatives, in our approach we are taking into account all
the capacities compatible with the provided preferences giving, consequently, more stable results.
Let us observe that other contributions developing the procedure introduced in Roubens (2001)
have been proposed in Marichal et al. (2005); Marichal and Roubens (2001); Meyer and Roubens
(2005). In particular, Meyer and Roubens (2005) introduced the TOMASO software implementing
the procedure previously described, while Marichal et al. (2005) studied the potentialities of the same
method by means of two examples.
Finally, another contribution dealing with the use of the Choquet integral preference model (not
only the 2-additive one) for sorting problems, is due to Benabbou et al. (2017). Anyway, in that
paper, the authors deal not only with sorting but also with ranking and choice problems from an
artificial intelligence point of view. They propose several procedures to reduce, iteration by iteration,
the space of capacities compatible with the preferences provided by the DM9.
6. Case study
In this section, we shall apply the proposed methodology to sovereign ratings of the countries
belonging to the European Union (EU)10. The 28 Countries are evaluated with respect to three
macro-criteria and 11 elementary criteria descending from them described in Table 2 and articulated
as shown in Fig. 1:
• Economic (Ec) (g1):
– GDP per capita (GDPc) (g(1,1)),
– Investment/GDP (I/GDP) (g(1,2)),
– Savings/GDP (S/GDP) (g(1,3)),
– Exports/GDP (Ep/GDP) (g(1,4)),
9The interested reader can also have a look at Branke et al. (2017) and Ciomek et al. (2016).
10https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en. For the time being, the United Kingdom remains a full member
of the EU and rights and obligations continue to fully apply in and to the UK.
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• Governmental (Gov) (g2):
– Primary balance/GDP (PB/GDP) (g(2,1)),
– Expenditure/GDP (Ex/GDP) (g(2,2)),
– Interest/revenues (I-Ex/R) (g(2,3)),
– Net debt/GDP (D/GDP) (g(2,4)),
• Financial (Fin) (g3):
– Current account receipts/GDP (CAR/GDP) (g(3,1)),
– Current account balance/GDP (CAB/GDP) (g(3,2)),
– Trade balance/GDP (TB/GDP) (g(3,3)).
Table 2: Description of the considered criteria
Elementary criterion Description
g1 Economic Data (Ec) Economic assessments key indicators
g2 Government Data (Gov) Government assessment key indicators
g3 Balance of Payment Data (Fin) External assessment key indicators
g(1,1) GDP per capita (GDPc) Total US dollar market value of goods and services produced by resident factors of production,
divided by population
g(1,2) Investment/GDP (I/GDP) Expenditure on capital goods including plant, equipment, and housing, plus the change in
inventories, as a percent of GDP
g(1,3) Savings/GDP (S/GDP) Investment plus the current account surplus (deficit), as a percent of GDP
g(1,4) Exports/GDP (Ep/GDP) Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP
g(2,1) Primary balance/GDP (PB/ GDP) Surplus (deficit) plus interest payments on general government debt, as a percent of GDP
g(2,2) Expenditure/GDP (Ex/GDP) General government recurrent expenditure, for purposes such as salaries, goods for immediate
consumption, interest and other transfers, plus capital spending that increases the value of
general government physical assets, plus net lending (where a subsidy is involved), as a percent of GDP
g(2,3) Interest/revenues (I-Ex/R) Interest payments on general government debt, as a percent of general government revenues
g(2,4) Net debt/GDP (D/GDP) Gross debt minus general government financial assets
g(3,1) Current account receipts/GDP (CAR/GDP) CAR include proceeds from exports of goods and services, factor income earned by
residents from nonresidents, and official and private transfers to residents from nonresidents,
as a percent of GDP
g(3,2) Current account balance/GDP (CAB/GDP) Exports of goods and services minus imports of the same plus net factor income
plus official and private net transfers, as a percent of GDP
g(3,3) Trade balance/GDP (TB/ GDP) Receipts from exports of goods minus payments for imports of goods as a percentage of GDP
Figure 1: Hierarchical structure of criteria considered in the case study
Global
G0
Ec
g1
GDPpc
g(1,1)
I/GDP
g(1,2)
S/GDP
g(1,3)
Ep/GDP
g(1,4)
Gov
g2
PB/GDP
g(2,1)
Ex/GDP
g(2,2)
I −Ex/R
g(2,3)
D/GDP
g(2,4)
Fin
g3
CAR/GDP
g(3,1)
CAB/GDP
g(3,2)
TB/GDP
g(3,3)
The evaluations of the 28 countries on the 11 elementary criteria are shown in Table 3. Data
have been collected from Standard & Poor’s Global Market Intelligence which published them on
December 14th 201711.
Since, as explained in Section 3.2, the application of the Choquet integral implies that all eval-
uations are expressed on the same scale, we apply the following normalization technique used in
11https://www.capitaliq.com/CIQDotNet/CreditResearch/RenderArticle.aspx?articleId=1969912&SctArtId=446671&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=10373140&sourceRevId=1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20280116-20:50:00
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Table 3: Performances of the 28 Countries on the 11 elementary criteria taken into account and their rating
g(1,1) g(1,2) g(1,3) g(1,4) g(2,1) g(2,2) g(2,3) g(2,4) g(3,1) g(3,2) g(3,3) S&P rating Classification
Austria 47801,33 24.3 26.7 54.1 0.86 50.60 3.95 73.31 62.30 2.38 0.45 AA+ C4
Belgium 43762,16 24.1 24.1 85.7 1.11 52.50 5.12 97.35 99.17 -0.02 0.20 AA C4
Bulgaria 8058,38 19.3 22.5 64.7 0.85 34.92 2.44 15.62 71.61 3.25 -3.24 BBB- C2
Cyprus 25140,98 19.3 11.9 64.8 2.89 38.00 6.20 91.17 90.47 -7.37 -21.76 BB+ C1
Croatia 13122,86 20.2 23.2 51.3 1.93 46.10 6.73 74.68 58.65 3.07 -17.11 BB C1
Denmark 56272,84 20.8 28.3 54.2 0.08 53.20 2.45 23.95 64.86 7.47 5.64 AAA C4
Estonia 19453,92 24.5 25.5 77.2 0.15 40.90 0.12 -3.28 84.55 0.97 -4.42 AA- C4
Finland 45860,33 22.6 21.3 36.1 -0.20 55.30 2.04 23.82 43.53 -1.23 0.40 AA+ C4
France 38604,63 22.8 21.6 30.0 -1.06 56.10 3.46 90.45 38.71 -1.14 -1.27 AA C4
Germany 45182,19 20.2 27.7 46.1 1.47 44.70 2.82 59.84 53.48 7.53 8.10 AAA C4
Greece 18912,07 10.6 10.1 31.3 1.80 50.80 5.61 167.65 32.93 -0.47 -9.33 B- C1
Ireland 68030,49 32.8 33.0 128.7 1.55 27.90 7.88 61.63 153.47 0.15 41.37 A+ C3
Italy 32077,55 17.2 19.5 31.2 1.70 49.30 8.06 122.74 35.40 2.35 3.16 BBB C2
Latvia 15570,01 21.6 21.0 59.5 0.55 37.70 3.37 31.24 68.80 -0.63 -9.53 A- C3
Lithuania 16197,33 17.7 17.0 76.1 0.52 35.70 3.48 34.88 81.23 -0.77 -5.51 A- C3
Luxembourg 106866,09 18.4 23.0 223.2 0.89 42.90 0.66 -15.46 557.37 4.53 -6.61 AAA C4
Malta 27295,35 22.2 31.7 136.0 2.71 37.80 4.94 44.48 236.48 9.48 -16.95 A- C3
Netherlands 48474,25 20.6 29.4 85.1 1.72 42.90 2.12 53.50 119.27 8.79 12.36 AAA C4
Poland 13248,49 20.3 19.5 53.8 0.27 41.10 4.99 49.46 57.37 -0.79 -0.30 BBB+ C2
Portugal 21118,94 16.2 16.8 42.9 2.41 45.00 8.73 116.80 50.83 0.64 -5.41 BBB- C2
U.K. 39493,34 17.6 12.3 29.1 0.07 40.50 6.76 83.43 36.71 -5.32 -6.84 AA C4
Czech Rep. 20161,53 26.5 28.3 76.1 1.63 39.20 2.07 29.40 80.70 1.80 5.52 AA- C4
Romania 10289,76 24.5 20.9 41.1 -1.68 37.10 4.19 30.92 45.85 -3.55 -6.79 BBB- C2
Slovakia 17532,04 23.1 22.4 94.6 -0.23 41.90 4.16 46.32 96.90 -0.67 2.01 A+ C3
Slovenia 23504,60 19.1 24.3 79.1 1.54 44.50 5.59 58.77 84.06 5.20 3.46 A+ C3
Spain 28288,91 20.9 22.6 34.1 -0.59 41.10 6.61 88.92 40.09 1.69 -2.06 BBB+ C2
Sweden 54215,57 25.5 30.0 44.6 1.22 49.30 1.05 25.08 54.01 4.46 2.03 AAA C4
Hungary 13372,27 20.8 24.8 88.6 0.46 51.50 6.03 68.62 94.13 4.01 3.08 BBB- C2
Pref. Direction Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Dec. Dec. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Greco et al. (2018). For each elementary criterion gt, let us compute the mean (Mt) and the stan-
dard deviation (st) of the evaluations in Table 3 as follows:
Mt =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
gt(a) and st =
√√√√√
∑
a∈A
(gt(a)−Mt)
2
|A|
.
Then, for each a ∈ A and for each t ∈ EG, the z-score g
z
t (a) is obtained:
gzt (a) =
gt(a)−Mt
st
.
Finally, the normalized evaluation gt(a) of a ∈ A on elementary criterion gt is computed as
gt(a) =


0 if gt(a) 6 Mt − 3st,
0.5 +
gz
t
(a)
6
, if Mt − 3st < gt(a) < Mt + 3st,
1, if gt(a) > Mt + 3st
if gt has an increasing direction of preference (the more the evaluation gt(a), the better a is on gt),
and as
gt(a) =


0 if gt(a) > Mt + 3st,
0.5−
gz
t
(a)
6
, if Mt − 3st < gt(a) < Mt + 3st,
1, if gt(a) 6 Mt − 3st
if gt has a decreasing direction of preference (the less the evaluation gt(a), the better a is on gt).
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In consequence of the application of the considered normalization technique, the new data are
therefore shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Performances of the 28 Countries on the 11 elementary criteria taken into account
g(1,1) g(1,2) g(1,3) g(1,4) g(2,1) g(2,2) g(2,3) g(2,4) g(3,1) g(3,2) g(3,3)
Austria 0.6176 0.6314 0.6144 0.4403 0.4970 0.6657 0.5290 0.4382 0.4487 0.5317 0.5224
Belgium 0.5860 0.6229 0.5374 0.5708 0.5356 0.7126 0.4427 0.3362 0.5111 0.4293 0.5187
Bulgaria 0.3062 0.4192 0.4900 0.4841 0.4954 0.2792 0.6404 0.6831 0.4644 0.5688 0.4671
Cyprus 0.4401 0.4192 0.1760 0.4845 0.8109 0.3551 0.3630 0.3624 0.4963 0.1157 0.1896
Croatia 0.3459 0.4574 0.5107 0.4287 0.6625 0.5548 0.3239 0.4324 0.4425 0.5611 0.2593
Denmark 0.6840 0.4828 0.6618 0.4407 0.3763 0.7298 0.6397 0.6477 0.4530 0.7489 0.6002
Estonia 0.3955 0.6398 0.5789 0.5357 0.3872 0.4266 0.8115 0.7633 0.4863 0.4715 0.4494
Finland 0.6024 0.5592 0.4545 0.3660 0.3330 0.7816 0.6699 0.6482 0.4169 0.3777 0.5216
France 0.5456 0.5677 0.4633 0.3408 0.2000 0.8013 0.5652 0.3654 0.4088 0.3815 0.4966
Germany 0.5971 0.4574 0.6440 0.4073 0.5913 0.5203 0.6124 0.4954 0.4338 0.7514 0.6370
Greece 0.3913 0.0499 0.1227 0.3462 0.6424 0.6707 0.4066 0.0378 0.3990 0.4101 0.3759
Ireland 0.7762 0.9921 0.8010 0.7483 0.6037 0.1061 0.2391 0.4878 0.6029 0.4365 1
Italy 0.4944 0.3300 0.4011 0.3458 0.6269 0.6337 0.2258 0.2284 0.4032 0.5304 0.5630
Latvia 0.3651 0.5168 0.4456 0.4626 0.4490 0.3477 0.5718 0.6168 0.4597 0.4033 0.3729
Lithuania 0.3700 0.3513 0.3271 0.5311 0.4444 0.2984 0.5637 0.6013 0.4807 0.3973 0.4331
Luxembourg 1 0.3810 0.5048 1 0.5016 0.4759 0.7717 0.8150 1 0.6234 0.4166
Malta 0.4569 0.5422 0.7625 0.7784 0.7831 0.3502 0.4560 0.5606 0.7434 0.8346 0.2617
Netherlands 0.6229 0.4743 0.6944 0.5683 0.6300 0.4759 0.6640 0.5223 0.5451 0.8052 0.7008
Poland 0.3469 0.4616 0.4011 0.4391 0.4057 0.4315 0.4523 0.5394 0.4403 0.3964 0.5112
Portugal 0.4085 0.2876 0.3212 0.3941 0.7367 0.5277 0.1764 0.2536 0.4293 0.4574 0.4346
U.K. 0.5525 0.3470 0.1879 0.3371 0.3748 0.4167 0.3217 0.3952 0.4054 0.2031 0.4132
Czech Rep. 0.4010 0.7247 0.6618 0.5311 0.6161 0.3847 0.6677 0.6246 0.4798 0.5069 0.5984
Romania 0.3237 0.6398 0.4426 0.3866 0.1041 0.3329 0.5113 0.6181 0.4208 0.2787 0.4139
Slovakia 0.3804 0.5804 0.4870 0.6075 0.3284 0.4512 0.5135 0.5528 0.5072 0.4016 0.5458
Slovenia 0.4272 0.4107 0.5433 0.5435 0.6021 0.5153 0.4080 0.4999 0.4855 0.6520 0.5675
Spain 0.4647 0.4871 0.4930 0.3577 0.2727 0.4315 0.3328 0.3719 0.4111 0.5023 0.4848
Sweden 0.6679 0.6823 0.7122 0.4011 0.5526 0.6337 0.7429 0.6429 0.4346 0.6204 0.5461
Hungary 0.3478 0.4828 0.5581 0.5827 0.4351 0.6879 0.3756 0.4581 0.5025 0.6012 0.5618
For the sake of simplicity, we grouped the 25 rating classes to which Countries can be assigned
by S&P into four classes only, as shown in Table 5. For example, a country that S&P would assign
to a class between AA- and AAA is assigned to C4, while a country is assigned to category C1 if its
S&P rating is lower than BBB−. In this way, Austria is assigned to C4 being rated AA+, while
Cyprus and Croatia are assigned to category C1 since their ratings are BB+ and BB, respectively.
The categories to which the considered Countries are assigned by using the described classification
rule are shown in the last column of Table 3.
Table 5: Categories of rating defined for our case study
Category Label From... To...
C4 AA− AAA
C3 A− A+
C2 BBB− BBB+
C1 otherwise
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6.1. Part I: Justification of the use of the Choquet integral for sorting
In financial applications, in general, a weighted sum is used as underlying preference model to
aggregate the performances of the alternatives on the criteria at hand. Consequently, at first, we
shall check if
WS(a,w) =
∑
t∈EG
wtgt(a)
is able to represent the class assignments in Table 3, where w = [wt]t∈EG is such that wt > 0 for all
t ∈ EG and
∑
t∈EG
wt = 1.
From a technical point of view, the existence of such a compatible model can be checked by solving
the following LP problem
ε∗WS = max ε, subject to,
bh−1 6 WS(a,w),
WS(a,w) + ε 6 bh,

 if a −→0 Ch
wt > 0 for all t ∈ EG,∑
t∈EG
wt = 1,
b0 = 0, b4 = 1,
bh−1 + ε 6 bh, h = 1, . . . , 4.


EDMWS
(11)
We get that EDMWS is feasible but ε
∗
WS = −0.0286 < 0. This means that there not exists any vector of
weights w and any threshold vector b = (b0, b1, . . . , b4), with 0 = b0 < b1 < . . . < b4 = 1
12, restoring
the countries’ classifications provided in Table 3. Consequently, a weighted sum is not able to justify
these assignments.
For this reason, we use a slightly more complex preference model, that is the 2-additive Choquet
integral, described in Section 3.2. Solving the LP problem
ε∗Ch = max ε subject to,
EDMCh ∪ E
TC
Ch
(12)
we get that the set EDMCh ∪E
TC
Ch is feasible and ε
∗
Ch = 0.0024 > 0. Consequently, there exists at least
on set of Mo¨bius parameters and a vector of thresholds b compatible with the considered Countries’
assignments.
The application of the 2-additive Choquet integral involves 66 parameters: 11 Mo¨bius parameters
for the elementary criteria and one Mo¨bius parameter for each pair of elementary criteria. Therefore,
as described in detail in Section 4.1, we look for the minimal sets of interacting criteria necessary
to restore the considered assignments. Solving the different MILP problems, we get the six different
sets of pairs of interacting criteria shown in Table 6.
Looking at the table, one can observe that 4 pairs of interacting criteria are necessary to justify
the considered assignments. This is a relevant reduction since, in this way, only 15 Mo¨bius param-
eters are enough in the considered preference model instead of the 66 mentioned above. Moreover,
many times the same pair of interacting criteria is present in all discovered minimal sets and, above
all, the core of these minimal sets of interacting criteria (Angilella et al., 2014; Greco et al., 2001) is
12Since all evaluations in Table 4 are in the interval [0, 1] and, consequently, the maximum evaluation of a Country
at comprehensive level is 1, we put b4 = 1.
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Table 6: Minimal sets of pairs of interacting criteria. “+” in the table represents a positive interaction, while “-”
represents a negative interactions.
ΓMin1 Γ
Min
2 Γ
Min
3 Γ
Min
4 Γ
Min
5 Γ
Min
6
{GDPc , Ep/GDP} + + + + + +
{GDPc , I − Ex/R} - - - -
{Ep/GDP , I − Ex/R} + + - +
{Ep/GDP , TB/GDP} + + +
{CAR/GDP , TB/GDP} + + +
{I − Ex/R , TB/GDP} +
{GDPc , D/GDP} - +
{D/GDP , CAR/GDP} +
represented by the pair {GDPpc, ExGDP} that is composed of positively interacting criteria in all
minimal sets. This means that the positive interaction between GDP per capita and Exports/GDP
is fundamental to explain the provided Countries’ assignments.
At the same time one can underline that, as observed in Section 4.1, some pairs of criteria are posi-
tively interacting in one minimal set and negatively interacting in another. For example, Ep/GDP
and I − Ex/R are negatively interacting in ΓMin3 and positively interacting in the other three min-
imal sets in which they interact, while, GDPc and D/GDP are negatively interacting in ΓMin4 and
positively interacting in ΓMin5 .
6.2. Part II: Exploring the results of NAROR and SMAA
While, in the previous section, we have shown the potentialities of the 2-additive Choquet integral
to represent the assignments provided by the DM, in this section we shall show the application of
the NAROR and SMAA methodologies to sorting problems when the 2-additive Choquet integral is
considered as preference model.
Differently from the case above in which the preference assignments regarded all the 28 EU
countries, in this section we shall assume that the DM provided the following preference information
in terms of:
• comparison between criteria:
– Net debt/GDP is more important than Primary balance/GDP,
– Savings/GDP is more important than Investment/GDP,
– Current account balance/GDP is more important than Current account receipts/GDP,
• interaction between criteria:
– There is a negative interaction between GDP per capita and Exports/GDP,
– There is a positive interaction between Interest/revenues and Net Debt/GDP,
– There is a positive interaction between Current account receipts/GDP and Current ac-
count balance/GDP,
• assignments examples:
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Global Ec Gov Fin
Germany C4 Sweden C4 Netherlands C4 Denmark C4
Slovenia C3 Spain C2 Slovakia C3 Lithuania C3
Italy C2 Cyprus C1 Portugal C2 Poland C2
Greece C1 Greece C1
6.2.1. NAROR results
Solving the LP problem (12), we get ε∗Ch > 0. This means that there exists at least one set of
Mo¨bius parameters and at least one thresholds vector compatible with the preference information
provided in the previous section. To get more stable assignments, in this section, we shall apply the
NAROR. In Tables 7 and 8 we presented the new necessary and possible assignments of the countries
on which the DM did not provide any assignment.
Table 7: New necessary assignments at global level as well as with respect to Economic, Governmental and Financial
points of view
Global Ec Gov Fin
Ireland C4 Netherlands C4
Greece C1
Table 8: New possible assignments at global level as well as with respect to Economic, Governmental and Financial
points of view
Global Ec Gov Fin
Austria [C2, C4] Croatia [C2, C4] Austria [C2, C4]
Belgium [C2, C4] Denmark [C3, C4] Belgium [C3, C4]
Greece C1 Finland [C3, C4] Estonia [C3, C4]
Ireland C4 Luxembourg [C3, C4] Finland [C1, C2]
Spain [C1, C3] France [C1, C2]
Sweden [C3, C4] Ireland [C3, C4]
Luxembourg [C3, C4]
Netherlands C4
U.K. [C1, C2]
Czech Rep. [C3, C4]
Romania [C1, C2]
Slovakia [C3, C4]
Slovenia [C3, C4]
Hungary [C3, C4]
Looking at table 7 one can observe that the new necessary assignments obtained by the application
of the Choquet integral are very few. Indeed, at global level and with respect to governmental aspects,
there is not any new necessary assignments; with respect to economic aspects, Ireland is necessarily
assigned to C4, while Greece is assigned to C1. Finally, on financial aspects, Netherlands has to be
necessarily assigned to C4.
Analogously, in Table 8 we reported the new possible assignments regarding the countries which have
not been provided as reference assignments from the DM. Again, the column corresponding to the
global level is empty meaning that all countries on which the DM did not provide any preference
at global level, can be possibly assigned to the whole range of classes, that is [C1, C4]. Looking at
the particular aspects, some more in deep information can be obtained. For example, on economic
aspects, Austria can be possibly assigned to the interval of classes [C2, C4]. This means that there
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is not any instance of the preference model compatible with the preferences provided by the DM
assigning Austria to the class C1. On governmental aspects, 6 countries can be assigned to less than
the four considered classes and, in particular, Croatia and Spain to three classes, while Denmark,
Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden to the interval of classes [C3, C4]. Finally, the financial aspect is
the one on which more new information is obtained. Indeed, of the 24 countries on which the DM did
not provide any preference information, 14 can be possibly assigned to an interval of classes narrower
than [C1, C4]. In particular, Austria can be assigned to three classes in the interval [C2, C4], while all
the other countries, apart from the Netherlands that could be necessarily assigned (and consequently
possibly assigned) to C4, can be placed in two contiguous classes only.
6.2.2. SMAA results
Since most of the countries can be possibly assigned to more than one class at global level as
well at partial level, in this section we shall describe the application of the SMAA methodology,
as described in section 4.3, which permitted to get more robust results in terms of frequency of
assignments of any Country at global level as well as with respect to the 3 considered aspects in
the considered hierarchy of criteria. In Table 9, we report the class acceptability indices of all the
considered Countries.
Table 9: Class acceptability indices at global level as well as with respect to the three macro-criteria at hand
Global level Ec Gov Fin
C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4
Austria 0 4.404 95.596 0 0 0 4.461 95.539 0 4.902 80.623 14.475 0 0 77.839 22.161
Belgium 0 70.220 29.780 0 0 29.949 33.432 36.619 0 40.468 59.450 0.082 0 0 78.712 21.288
Bulgaria 0 34.678 65.322 0 18.495 81.505 0 0 0 0 0.506 99.494 0 0 63.929 36.071
Cyprus 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0.207 75.155 24.638 100 0 0 0
Croatia 0 87.318 12.682 0 3.348 93.771 2.881 0 0 0 75.305 24.695 0 0 100 0
Denmark 0 0 0 100 0 0 0.562 99.438 0 0 0.167 99.833 0 0 0 100
Estonia 0 1.625 98.375 0 0 15.083 27.477 57.440 0 0 0 100 0 0 82.225 17.775
Finland 0 100 0 0 2.082 96.484 1.434 0 0 0 0.244 99.756 85.270 14.730 0 0
France 76.851 23.149 0 0 1.490 97.241 1.269 0 0 99.561 0.439 0 93.813 6.187 0 0
Germany 0 0 0 100 0 0.340 11.084 88.575 0 0 27.471 72.529 0 0 5.396 94.604
Greece 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 4.750 95.250 0 0 0 100 0 23.676 75.045 1.279 0 0 7.050 92.950
Italy 0 100 0 0 64.928 35.072 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0
Latvia 7.259 92.741 0 0 30.704 69.296 0 0 0 0 22.890 77.110 0.035 90.684 9.281 0
Lithuania 15.579 84.421 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 45.113 54.887 0 0 100 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 100 0 32.017 27.526 40.457 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Malta 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Netherlands 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Poland 66.584 33.416 0 0 59.212 40.788 0 0 0 0 94.320 5.680 0 100 0 0
Portugal 49.364 50.636 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 47.882 52.118 0
U.K. 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0
Czech Rep. 0 0 62.111 37.889 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 61.996 38.004
Romania 99.478 0.522 0 0 18.087 81.895 0.018 0 0 62.665 37.335 0 100 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 96.311 3.689 0 0 78.798 20.208 0.994 0 0.000 100.000 0 0 0 91.353 8.647
Slovenia 0 0 100 0 0 63.647 27.815 8.537 0 0 50.404 49.596 0 0 20.577 79.423
Spain 18.253 81.747 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 5.885 94.115 0
Sweden 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 54.529 45.471
Hungary 0 10.564 89.436 0 0 44.028 33.960 22.012 0 19.906 80.094 0 0 0 31.537 68.463
Looking at the results in the table, one can observe that the number of classes to which each
Country can be assigned is narrower than the interval of classes to which the same Countries can be
possibly assigned by the application of the NAROR. For example, we observed that Austria can be
possibly assigned to the interval [C2, C4] at global level. Anyway, looking at the class acceptability
indices in Table 9 Austria is assigned to two classes only and, in particular, to C2 and C3 with
frequencies 4.404% and 95.596%, respectively. This is not surprising since, as explained in the
section devoted to the SMAA methodology, the CAI are obtained performing a sampling of the
instances of the model compatible with the preferences provided by the DM. Consequently, the fact
that Austria is assigned to C4 with a frequency equal to 0% means that among the instances sampled
by SMAA there is not anyone assigning Austria to this class. Analogous observations can be done
at macro-criteria level observing that the number of classes to which each country can be assigned
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is never 4 and most of the countries have a class acceptability index greater than 0% for two classes
only.
Since, as previously explained, for each instance of the considered preference model compatible
with the information provided by the DM we can get an assignment of the countries at global level
as well as at macro-criteria level, we have computed the most frequent classification of the countries,
that is the classification that appeared more frequently applying all the compatible instances. We got
124 different countries’ assignments at comprehensive level, 437 countries’ assignments on economic
aspects, 205 countries’ assignments on economic aspects and, finally, 91 countries’ assignments on
financial aspects. The most frequent ones are reported in Table 10.
Table 10: The most frequent assignments at global level as well as with respect to the three macro-criteria taken into
account. The frequencies are referring to the number of times the considered assignment was obtained considering the
whole set of compatible models.
Global Ec Gov Fin
Austria C3 C4 C3 C3
Belgium C2 C2 C3 C3
Bulgaria C3 C2 C4 C3
Cyprus C1 C1 C3 C1
Croatia C2 C2 C3 C3
Denmark C4 C4 C4 C4
Estonia C3 C2 C4 C3
Finland C2 C2 C4 C1
France C1 C2 C2 C1
Germany C4 C4 C3 C4
Greece C1 C1 C2 C1
Ireland C4 C4 C3 C4
Italy C2 C2 C2 C3
Latvia C2 C2 C3 C2
Lithuania C2 C1 C3 C3
Luxembourg C4 C2 C4 C4
Malta C4 C4 C4 C4
Netherlands C4 C4 C4 C4
Poland C1 C2 C3 C2
Portugal C1 C1 C2 C2
U.K. C1 C1 C2 C1
Czech Rep. C4 C4 C4 C3
Romania C1 C2 C3 C1
Slovakia C2 C2 C3 C3
Slovenia C3 C2 C3 C4
Spain C2 C2 C2 C3
Sweden C4 C4 C4 C3
Hungary C3 C2 C3 C4
Frequency 9.904% 10.416% 11.218% 10.607
As already described in Section 4.3, the class acceptability indices shown in Table 9 can be
aggregate to produce a single precise assignment by minimizing the function in eq. (9). In particular,
let us show that the final assignment is dependent on the choice of the distance function d considering
the economic macro-criterion. For such a reason, let us take into account three different distances
being d (Ch, Ck) = 1, d (Ch, Ck) = |h − k| and d (Ch, Ck) =
√
|h− k|. On one hand, the choice
d (Ch, Ck) = 1 implies that the error in assigning an alternative to a wrong class is not dependent on
how far is the class to which the alternative is wrongly assigned; on the other hand, d (Ch, Ck) = |h−k|
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and d (Ch, Ck) =
√
|h− k| imply that the error increases more in case d (Ch, Ck) = |h − k| is
considered and less in considering d (Ch, Ck) =
√
|h− k|. Minimizing the function in eq. (9) we get
that, independently on the choice of the three distances d, all Countries are assigned to the class h
for which the corresponding class acceptability index is the highest, apart from the three Countries
shown in Table 11. Indeed, in the case d (Ch, Ck) = 1, the three countries are assigned to the class
in correspondence of which the Country presents the highest CAI, so Belgium and Luxembourg are
assigned to C4, while Hungary is assigned to C2. In the other two cases, the Countries are assigned
to different classes. In particular, Belgium and Luxembourg are assigned in both cases to C3, while
Hungary is assigned to C3, when d (Ch, Ck) = |h− k| and again to C2, when d (Ch, Ck) =
√
|h− k|.
Table 11: Final assignments for three different distances d
d = 1 d = |h− k|
√
|h− k|
Belgium C4 C3 C3
Luxembourg C4 C3 C3
Hungary C2 C3 C2
Let us conclude this section by observing one thing that can be also the introduction for the next
section. Of course, the results obtained by the NAROR and the SMAA methodologies are strictly
dependent on the exemplary assignments that have been provided by the DM. For example, looking
at the most frequent country assignments shown in Table 10, no country has been assigned to C3
on economic aspects as well as no country has been assigned to C1 on governmental aspects. In
particular, this result is also enforced by the fact that the class assignment index of all countries on
C1 at governmental level is always equal to 0%. Indeed, looking at the preferences provided by the
DM, one can observe that the DM was not able to assign any country to the class C3 on economic
aspects as well as any country to C1 on governmental aspects. So the question is now “which is the
predictive capability of the method”? In other words, we are asking which is the capability of the
method to get a correct countries’ assignment starting from the example assignments provided by
the DM. This aspect will be investigated in the next section.
6.3. Part IV: Predictive capability of the proposed method
As already introduced in the section above, in this section we shall study the predictive capability
of the proposed sorting model as a function of the number of assignments provided by the DM at
comprehensive level. To this aim we propose a comparison of four methods by means of an in-sample
forecast procedure (Brooks, 2014) in which the parameters of the model are estimated by some
examples and then applied to the whole set. The reasons to adopt this procedure are mainly two: at
first, the results of the procedure are easy to be read and they permit a fair comparison between the
considered methods. At second, the in-sample forecast procedures have shown a significant predictive
ability in the financial framework (Inoue and Kilian, 2005; Rapach and Wohar, 2006).
We have compared the following four methods:
• weighted sum (WS),
• 2-additive Choquet integral with all possible pairs of interacting criteria (CH),
• 2-additive Choquet integral with minimal sets of pairs of interacting criteria (MSCH),
• Multiple linear regression model (MLR) (Montgomery et al., 2012).
With respect to MLR we consider a multiple linear regression model similar to the one presented in
Ferri et al. (1999) in which we use as explanatory variables the eleven elementary criteria introduced
in Section 6. So, we suppose that the assignments have to be explained by the following model:
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Sj = α+ β1GDPci + β2
(I/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β3
(S/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β4
(Ep/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β5
(PB/GDP )i
GDPci
+ (13)
+β6
(Ex/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β7
(I − Ex/R)i
GDPci
+ β8
(D/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β9
(CAR/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β10
(CAB/GDP )i
GDPci
+ β11
(TB/GDP )i
GDPci
+ ε
where j = 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes the class to which the country i = 1, . . . , 28, can be assigned and index
i is used to denote the Country at hand. For example, GDPci is the evaluation of country i on
elementary criterion GDPc.
Regarding the MLR model, the following procedure is performed:
Step 1 we sample k reference assignments at comprehensive level of the 28 countries at hand shown
in Table 3, with k = 1, . . . , 27,
Step 2 using the k reference assignments, we estimate all the parameters of the model (13), that is
α, βt, t = 1, . . . , 11, and ε,
Step 3 we apply the considered model using the inferred parameters to assign the remaining 28− k
countries. The assignment is performed as follows: The assignment of the predicted value is
done in terms of minimum distance (absolute value) from one of the four classes.
The procedure described above is therefore performed 50 times for each k = 1, . . . , 27 and 28 times
for k = 27. This means that 50 times we sampled k assignments, different in each sample so that a
single sample of k assignments is not considered more than once. In the case k = 27, the procedure
is not a sampling since only 1 country has not been assigned and, therefore, it can be performed 28
times (once for each country).
To evaluate the goodness of the fit, we have considered the coefficients of determination (Kv˚alseth,
1985; Seber and Lee, 2012) (adjusted R2 or R
2
) and the p-value of the F -statistic (Seber and Lee,
2012) (at the 5% significance level). The results of the regressions validation are shown in Table 12,
where for each number of reference assignments, we report the minimum, medium and maximum
value of R
2
and the minimum, medium and maximum p-value of the F -statistic.
Table 12: Values of the regressions validation
# reference assignments R
2
(min/med/max) p-value of F-stat. (min/med/max)
14 -0.1954 / 0.6865 / 0.9894 0.0089 / 0.2179 / 0.6730
16 -0.0036 / 0.6247 / 0.9065 0.0103 / 0.1476 / 0.5543
18 0.2405 / 0.6115 / 0.9220 8.4956e-04 / 0.0915 / 0.3245
20 0.2719 / 0.5766 / 0.8722 6.5330e-04 / 0.0731 / 0.2451
22 0.3523 / 0.5716 / 0.8477 2.7331e-04 / 0.0429 / 0.1360
24 0.4107 / 0.5440 / 0.7643 6.6228e-04 / 0.0276 / 0.0688
26 0.4688 / 0.5573 / 0.7609 2.2877e-04 / 0.0128 / 0.0280
27 0.4914 / 0.5408 / 0.7069 5.1416e-04 / 0.0104 / 0.0174
With respect to the other three models, the procedure is a bit different. Indeed, while for the
MLR we are estimating a single vector of values, that is a single value for each of the considered
parameters in (13), for the other three models we are implementing a procedure aiming to take into
account robustness concerns and composed, therefore, of the following steps:
Step 1’ we sample k reference assignments at comprehensive level of the 28 countries at hand shown
in Table 3, with k = 1, . . . , 27,
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Step 2’ we check, for each of the three methods, if there exists at least one instance of the preference
model compatible with these reference assignments. Let us observe that ifWS is able to restore
the reference assignments then, of course, CH is able to restore the same assignments too since
the WS is a particular case of CH when there is not any interaction between the considered
criteria. Moreover, in this case we will not take into accountMSCH since the minimal number
of pairs of interacting criteria is equal to zero. For this reason, if WS is able to restore the
preferences provided by the DM, then we shall consider models WS and CH in the following
steps, while, in the opposite case (WS is not able to restore the preferences provided by the
DM), in the following steps we shall consider models CH andMSCH . In particular, regarding
MSCH , we shall check all minimal sets of pairs of interacting criteria compatible with the
provided reference assignments.
If neither WS nor CH are able to restore the reference assignments and we have not performed
yet the 50 runs13, we go again to Step 1’ sampling another set of k reference assignments,
otherwise we go to Step 3’,
Step 3’ for each of the two considered models compatible with the preferences provided by the DM
(WS and CH or CH andMSCH) we sample 10,000 compatible instances and we perform the
assignment of all countries with respect to all sampled compatible models. Regarding MSCH ,
we sample 10,000 compatible models for each considered minimal set of pairs of interacting
criteria. This means that if 3 minimal sets are able to restore the reference assignments,
then we shall sample 30,000 compatible instances getting, therefore, 30,000 different countries’
assignments,
Step 4’ for each of the two considered models compatible with the assignments provided by the DM
(WS and CH or CH and MSCH) we compute the CAI of all countries at hand considering
the assignments performed at the previous step,
Step 5’ each country a is considered correctly assigned if CAI(a, hcorrect) > p%, where p ∈ {50, 75, 100}
and Chcorrect is the class to which country a had to be assigned in Table 3. We are therefore
assuming that the model is assigning correctly Country a if the CAI corresponding to the class
to which the DM had liked to assign it is no lower than p%.
In Table 14 and in Fig. 2, we report and show the percentage of non-reference countries that have
been assigned to the correct class by means of each of the four methods at hand and considering the
three values of p, that is p = 50, p = 75 and p = 100.
Before commenting more in depth the results, let us underline from the data in Table 13 that CH
was able in all sampling to restore the considered reference assignments, while it was not the case for
the WS. In particular, the number of runs out of the 50 considered in which WS was able to restore
the reference assignments is decreasing with respect to k passing from its maximum (43) when k = 14
to its minimum (1) when k = 27. Another consideration is that while all the percentages in Table 14
(and, consequently, in Fig. 2) are obtained by the average over the 50 different samplings, the data
for WS and MSCH are obtained by the average of the number or times the WS was able or not
to restore the reference assignments. For example, while the percentages corresponding to the case
k = 14 are obtained by the average of values got in the 43 runs in which WS was able to restore the
reference assignments, the analogous percentage for MSCH are obtained by the average of 7 runs
only.
Looking at the data in Fig. 2, one can obviously conclude that MLR is the worst in terms
of predictive capability among the four considered models since, apart from very few cases, the
1328 in the case k = 27
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Table 13: Number of times each model was able to restore the considered reference assignments. The values marked
by * are computed out of 28 possible runs, while all the others are computed out of 50 runs
# reference assignments WS CH MSCH MLR
14 43 50 7 50
16 31 50 19 50
18 20 50 30 50
20 15 50 35 50
22 8 50 42 50
24 8 50 42 50
26 2 50 48 50
27 1* 28* 27* 28*
Table 14: Average percentage of countries assigned to the correct class considering the four methods at hand
# reference assignments WS (p = 50/p = 75/p = 100) CH (p = 50/p = 75/p = 100) MSCH (p = 50/p = 75/p = 100) MLR
14 54.8 / 48.8 / 39.0 57.5 / 52.0 / 43.0 60.2 / 49.0 / 38.8 40.1
16 54.5 / 50.0 / 43.3 63.1 / 59.3 / 50.3 64.9 / 54.4 / 43.0 45.0
18 57.5 / 53.0 / 49.0 65.2 / 61.6 / 56.8 68.6 / 62.3 / 52.7 44.6
20 63.3 / 60.0 / 54.2 66.5 / 64.3 / 58.3 70.3 / 63.6 / 57.1 46.7
22 54.1 / 52.1 / 52.1 66.0 / 65.3 / 63.0 70.2 / 62.7 / 56.4 43.0
24 50.0 / 50.0 / 46.9 53.5 / 51.5 / 50.0 58.9 / 47.6 / 40.5 38.0
26 50.0 / 50.0 / 50.0 63.0 / 63.0 / 63.0 66.6 / 65.6 / 59.4 41.0
27 0.000 / 0.000 / 0.000 60.7 / 60.7 / 60.7 62.9 / 63.0 / 50.3 39.3
Figure 2: Percentage of correct assignments for the non-reference countries considering each of the four methods
other three methods report better percentages of correct assignments. Looking at the three methods
different from MLR, it seems that the WS is the worst since at first, as underlined above, it is not
always able to represent the reference assignments and, secondly, in the cases in which it is able to
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represent the reference assignments the percentage of correct assignments is almost always lower than
the corresponding percentage for CH and MSCH being able to take into account the interaction
between pairs of elementary criteria.
Finally, comparing CH and MSCH , it seems that the second presents better percentages of correct
assignments in the case p = 50, they are comparable for p = 75 and CH seems better than MSCH
for p = 100.
7. Conclusions
Several methods have been proposed in Multiple Criteria Decision Aiding (MCDA) to deal with
sorting problems in which alternatives need to be assigned to one among the considered classes
ordered from the worst to the best with respect to the preferences provided by the Decision Maker
(DM). Despite many real world sorting problems involve alternatives evaluated on interacting criteria,
very few works have been developed in recent years to cope with this type of problems. In this paper,
we propose a sorting method based on the Choquet integral preference model able to take into account
the possible negative and positive interactions between the criteria at hand. A procedure to look
for the minimal number of pairs of interacting criteria is also presented here for the first time and
we think that this is an important introduction not only for our method but also for all the other
methods having the Choquet integral as underlying preference model.
To deal also with problems in which criteria are not interacting but also structured in a hierarchical
way, the new proposal puts the Multiple Criteria Hierarchy Process (MCHP) and the Choquet
integral preference model under a unified framework. The application of the MCHP to this context
permits to get finer assignments recommendations not only at comprehensive level (considering all
criteria simultaneously) but also a particular aspect being the most interesting for the DM.
The proposed method permits the DM to provide preference information in terms of reference
assignments, pairwise comparisons of alternatives and comparisons between criteria in terms of their
importance as well as in terms of possible interactions. In this case, more than one model could be
compatible with such information and, therefore, to take into account all the compatible models pro-
viding, therefore, more robust conclusions, the Robust Ordinal Regression (ROR) and the Stochastic
Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) are applied to the new method. On one hand, ROR
applied to the new sorting method provides necessary and possible assignments at comprehensive
level as well as on a particular macro-criterion. On the other hand, based on a sampling procedure,
SMAA gives the Class Acceptability Index (CAI) being the frequency with which an alternative is as-
signed to a particular class. To aggregate the different CAIs, a procedure based on the minimization
of a misclassification is proposed. It permits to summarize the different assignments into a unique
assignment being representative of the different CAIs.
The merits of the proposed hierarchical, interacting and robust sorting method have been shown
by its application to the financial rating of 28 European Countries. In particular, we have shown
that a weighted sum is not able to represent the considered assignments, while our model is able to
represent them. Moreover, we compared the predictive capabilities of two versions of our method (the
one considering a minimal set of pairs of interactions and the one admitting all possible interactions
between pairs of criteria) with other two methods based on a weighted sum and on a multiple linear
regression model, respectively. The two versions of our method present better results than the other
two since in all cases they are able to represent the reference assignments provided by the DM and,
moreover, they can assign the non reference Countries to the correct class more frequently than the
other two methods.
To conclude, we think that the proposed method can be successfully applied to any MCDA sorting
problem since it is able to take into account their main characteristics that is, interactions between
criteria, hierarchy of criteria and robustness concerns. As further directions of research, we plan to
28
extend the new sorting method to take into account also non-monotonic criteria and to apply it to
some real world sorting problem.
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